Monday

Civil Rights Claims

 Civil Rights Claims


 Instructions for Civil Rights Claims Under Section 1983

Section 1983 Litigation 


Statement of Relevant Facts

This matter arose out of a traffic stop and resulting traffic court that the defendant violated Plaintiff traffic constitutional and statutory rights. Plaintiff was traveling in her private owned conveyance that is a Ford Mustang traveling on February 24, 2025. Plaintiff admits she is an Ordained Minister and that her “ministerial parking plaque” was displayed on the dashboard.




Standard of Review


The judicial power here conferred by the Constitution is the

power to hear and determine those matters which affect the life,

liberty, or property of the citizens of the state” ​

-City of Sapulpa v. Land, 101 Okla. 22, 27 (Okla. 1924)


A court is an agency of the sovereign created by it directly or

indirectly under its authority, consisting of one or more officers,

established and maintained for the purpose of hearing and

determining issues of law and fact regarding legal rights and

alleged violations thereof, and of applying the sanctions of the law,

authorized to exercise its powers in due course of law at times and

places previously determined by lawful authority.​


Corpus Juris Secundum Volume 7 ATTORNEY, Starts on page 781

An attorney is by definition an agent when acting in his

professional capacity.​


The Constitution of this State provides: "In criminal prosecutions

the accused shall have the right to appear and defend in person

and by counsel" Const. art. 1, § 12. Courts of last resort in several

states have construed similar constitutional provisions in their

application to facts quite similar to those in the instant case.


in which the meaning of the word is traced back through Kent and

Sharswood to Blackstone, through which original sources we derive

our best definition of civil or municipal law as being "a rule of civil

conduct prescribed by the supreme power of a state."”

-Sevier v. Riley, 198 Cal. 170, 175 (Cal. 1926)​


The civil laws effective in an area of exclusive Federal jurisdiction

are Federal law, notwithstanding their derivation from State laws,

and a cause arising under such laws may be brought in or

removed to a Federal district court under sections 24 or 28 of the

former Judicial Code (now sections 1331 and 1441 of title 28,

United States Code), giving jurisdiction to such courts of civil

actions arising under the color of law.


No one is bound to obey an unconstitutional law and no

courts are bound to enforce it." ​ -16 AM Jurisprudence 2 d Constitutional Law 256


An unconstitutional act is not law; it confers no rights; it imposes no duties; affords no protection; it creates no office; it is in legal contemplation, as inoperative as though it had never been passed.” ​

-Norton vs Shelby County, 118 U.S. 425, p. 442


"An unconstitutional law is void, and is as no law. ​

An offence created by it is not a crime." ​

Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371, 376 (1880), ​

-Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 408 (1963)


"it never became a law and was as much a nullity as if it had been the act or declaration of an unauthorized assemblage

of individuals." ​

-Ryan v. Lynch, 68 Ill. 160


An officer who acts in violation of the Constitution ceases to represent the government. ​

-Brookfield Const. Co. v. Stewart, 284 F. Supp. 94

Officers of the court have no immunity, when

violating a constitutional right, for they are deemed

to know the law.” ​

-Owens v Independence 100 S.C.T. 1398

Judge loses his absolute immunity from damage actions only when he acts in clear absence of all jurisdiction or performance of an act which is not

judicial in nature.” -Schucker v. Rockwood, 846 F.2d 1202 When enforcing mere statutes, judges of all courts do not act judicially and thus are not protected by

qualified” or “limited immunity,” ​

Owen v. City, 445 U.S. 662; ​

Bothke v. Terry, 713 F2d 1404


the judge of the municipal court is acting as an administrative

officer, and not in a judicial capacity” ​

-Thompson v. Smith, 155 Va. 367, (Va. 1930)

No officer can acquire jurisdiction by deciding that he has it. In all

such cases, every officer, whether judicial or ministerial, decides at

his peril.” ​

-Middleton v. Low, 30 Cal. 596, 607 (Cal. 1866)

Administrative is defined as follows: “Commonly the word has been defined as ministerial; pertaining to administration, particularly, having the character of executive or ministerial action; and, when particularly applied to official duties connected with government, executive, a ministerial duty; one in which nothing is 'left to discretion.” ​

2 C.J.S. p. 56.​

-Mauritz v. Schwind, 101 S.W.2d 1085 (Tex. App. 1937)/

Statements of counsel in their briefs or argument while enlightening to the Court are not sufficient for purposes of granting a motion to dismiss or summary judgment.”

-Trinsey v. Pagliaro, 229 F. Supp. 647, 649 (E.D. Pa. 1964)


Statement of Counsel can never be entered into the Evidence file,

as it is nothing but hearsay, and not up to the level of Fact.

Statements of counsel in their briefs or argument while enlightening to the Court are not sufficient for purposes of granting a motion to dismiss or summary judgment." 229 F. Supp. at 649. This is an uncontroversial statement that argument by counsel is not the same as evidence.”

-Sundsmo v. Calkins, 15-cv-2-jdp, 3 (W.D. Wis. Mar. 14, 2016)


Statements of counsel in their briefs or argument while

enlightening to the Court are not sufficient for purposes of

granting a motion to dismiss or summary judgment." Id. Here,

although Defendants made arguments in the answer and briefs,

the Magistrate Judge did not rely on those unsupported

statements and arguments of counsel in making recommendations...

-Penn v. Ogg, Case No.: 1:14-cv-76, 2014 Ohio 5481 (2014)

79


"Jurisdiction can be challenged at any time," and

"Jurisdiction, once challenged, cannot be assumed and

must be decided." ​

-Basso v. Utah Power & Light Co. 395 F 2d 906, 910


"Defense of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter

may be raised at any time, even on appeal." Hill Top

-Developers v. Holiday Pines Service Corp. 478 So. 2D, 368

Fla a DCA 1985)


"Once challenged, jurisdiction cannot be assumed, it

must be proved to exist." ​

-Stuck v. Medical Examiners 94 Ca 2d 751. 211 P2d 289

"There is no discretion to ignore that lack of jurisdiction."

-Joyce v. US, 474 F2d 215


"Where jurisdiction is contested, the burden of

establishing it rests upon the plaintiff." ​

-Loos v American Energy Savers, Inc., 168 I11.App.3d 558, 522

N.E.2d 841(1988)


"the burden of proving jurisdiction rests upon the party

asserting it." ​

-Bindell v City of Harvey, 212 Ill.App.3d 1042, 571 N.E.2d 1017(1st

Dist. 1991)


"Court must prove on the record, all jurisdiction facts

related to the jurisdiction asserted." ​

-Lantana v. Hopper,102 F. 2d 188; ​

Chicago v. New York 37 FSupp. 150


Where there is no jurisdiction there is no judge; the proceeding is

as nothing. Such has been the law from the days of the

Marshalsea, 10 Coke 68; also Bradley v.

Fisher, 13 Wall 335,351." ​

-Manning v. Ketcham, 58 F.2d 948.


A void judgment is one which, from its inception, was

a complete nullity and without legal effect” ​

-Lubben v. Selective Service System Local Bd. No. 27, 453 F.2d

645, 14 A.L.R. Fed. 298 (C.A. 1 Mass. 1972).

Hobbs v. U.S. Office of Personnel Management, 485 F.Supp.

456 (M.D. Fla. 1980).

Void judgment is one which has no legal force or

effect whatever, it is an absolute nullity, its invalidity

may be asserted by any person whose rights are

affected at any time and at any place and it need not

be attacked directly but may be attacked collaterally

whenever and wherever it is interposed.” ​

-City of Lufkin v. McVicker, 510 S.W. 2d 141 ​

(Tex. Civ. App. – Beaumont 1973).


An act wrongfully done by an officer,

under the pretended authority of his office,

and grounded upon corruption, to which the office is a mere shadow of color. ​

41 N. Y. 464.​


"Color of office" is defined by the law dictionaries, as “champagne,

an act wrongfully done by an officer, under the pretended

authority of his office, and grounded upon corruption, to which the

the office is a mere shadow of color.”​

-Griffiths v. Hardenbergh, 41 N.Y. 464


The words color of office necessarily imply an illegal claim of right

or authority to take the security, or to do the act in question, by

virtue of his office, which claim is a mere color or presence on the

part of the officer.​

"color of office" is when an act is evilly done, by the countenance

of an officer; and is always taken, in the worst sense, being

grounded upon corruption, to which the office is as a mere shadow

or color.”​

-Burrall v. Acker, 23 Wend. 606


"Colorable" is a word legally defined as "That which has or gives

color; that which is in appearance only, and not in reality, what it

purports to be, hence counterfeit, feigned, having the appearance

of truth."” ​

-Windle, Adm'x v. Flinn, 251 P.2d 136, 196 Or. 654 (1952)


In Texas no act or omission is a crime unless made so by statute.”

-Dawson v. Vance, 329 F. Supp. 1320, 1326 (S.D. Tex. 1971)


"But individuals, when acting as representatives of a collective

group, cannot be said to be exercising their personal rights and

duties nor to be entitled to their purely personal privileges. Rather

they assume the rights, duties and privileges of the artificial

entity or association of which they are agents or officers and they

are bound by its obligations. In their official capacity, therefore,

they have no privilege against self-incrimination. And the official

records and documents of the organization that are held by them

in a representative rather than in a personal capacity cannot be

the subject of the personal privilege against self-incrimination, even

though production of the papers might tend to incriminate them

personally." -Braswell v. United States, 487 U.S. 99, 110-11 (1988)


...the judgment of conviction was contrary to the weight of

evidence adduced at the trial, in other words, that the facts

elicited by the prosecution were not sufficient to prove said

defendant-appellant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. It is

believed that all of the authorities hold that a violation of the

instant section under consideration, even though it is deemed to

be an "infraction", rather than a crime, must be proved in all of its

essential elements, beyond a reasonable doubt.

-People v. Marsellus, 4 Misc. 2d 211, 213 (N.Y. Cnty. Ct. 1956)

Service of an appearance ticket on an accused does not confer

personal or subject matter jurisdiction upon a Criminal Court.”

-People v. Giusti, 176 Misc. 2d 377, 381 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1998)​

It is well settled that an appearance ticket is not an accusation.


It is well settled that an appearance ticket is not an accusatory

instrument and its filing does not confer jurisdiction over

defendant” ​

-People v. Gabbay, 175 Misc. 2d 421, 421 (N.Y. App. Term 1997)


Waivers of constitutional rights not only must be voluntary but

must be knowing, intelligent acts done with sufficient awareness of

the relevant circumstances and likely consequences.” ​

-Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970)


It is thus fraud where the court or a member is corrupted or

influenced or influence is attempted or where the judge has not

performed his judicial function — thus where the impartial

functions of the court have been directly corrupted.

-Bulloch v. United States, 763 F.2d 1115, 1121 (10th Cir. 1985)


18 USC 241: Conspiracy against rights

If two or more persons conspire to injure, oppress, threaten, or

intimidate any person in any State, Territory, Commonwealth,

Possession, or District in the free exercise or enjoyment of any

right or privilege secured to him by the Constitution or laws of the

United States, or because of his having so exercised the same;

You are still presumed innocent, and the government carries the burden of proof.


"In the exercise of any power or authority — "​

(a) No sanction shall be imposed or substantive rule or order be

issued except within jurisdiction delegated to the agency and as

authorized by law." -June 11, 1946, c. 324, § 9, 60 Stat. 242.”


-Olesen v. Stanard, 227 F.2d 785, 788 n.7 (9th Cir. 1955)​


When it appears, as it does here, that a court does not

have jurisdiction, it is the duty of the court to immediately dismiss

the action.” ​

-Stanard v. Olesen, 121 F. Supp. 607, 610 (S.D. Cal. 1954)


No officer can acquire

jurisdiction by deciding that he has it. In all such cases, every

officer, whether judicial or ministerial, decides at his peril.”​

-Middleton v. Low, 30 Cal. 596, 607 (Cal. 1866)


Where there is no jurisdiction over the subject matter, there is, as

well, no discretion to ignore that lack of jurisdiction. See F.R.Civ.P.

12(h)(3), supra note 1

-Joyce v. United States, 474 F.2d 215, 218 n.1 (3d Cir. 1973)


Although lack of probable cause may not be inferred from malice,

malice may be inferred from lack of probable cause.” ​

-Pauley v. Hall, 124 Mich. App. 255, 266 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983)


The Court of Appeals, Krucker, J., held that State Bar Act of 1933

creating State Bar Association as public corporation has no

viability and designation of State Bar as public corporation has no

legal efficacy” ​

-Bridegroom v. State Bar, 550 P.2d 1089, 27 Ariz. App. 47 (1976)

there is no such thing as a power of inherent sovereignty in the

government of the United States. It is a government of delegated

powers, supreme within its prescribed sphere, but powerless

outside of it. In this country sovereignty resides in the people, and

Congress can exercise no power which they have not, by their

Constitution, entrusted to it; all else is withheld.

-Juilliard v. Greenman, 110 U.S. 421, 467 (1884)



A delegate cannot delegate; an agent cannot delegate his

124Constitution Academy

functions to a subagent without the knowledge or consent of the

principal; the person to whom an office or duty is delegated

cannot lawfully devolve the duty on another, unless he be

expressly authorized to do so.”

9 Coke, 77; ​

Broom, Max. 840; ​

2 Kent, Comm. 633; ​

2 Steph. Comm. 119



A delegated power cannot be delegated again.”

-2 Inst. 597; Black's, 2d. 347; 2 Bouv. Inst. n. 1300



​​​​​“Unsupported contentions of material facts are not sufficient.

Material facts must be supported by affidavits and other

testimony and documents that would be admissible in evidence at

trial”​

-Cinco Enterprises, Inc. v. Benso, 890 P.2d 866, 871 (Okla. 1994)


Mere contention that facts exist or might exist is not sufficient to

withstand summary judgment.”​

-Loper v. Austin, 596 P.2d 544, 546 (Okla. 1979)



This Court has previously held that the mere contention that facts

exist or might exist is not sufficient to withstand summary

judgment. The party responding to a motion for summary

judgment has an obligation to present something which shows that

when the date of trial arrives, he will have some proof to support

126Constitution Academy his allegations​

-Davis v. Leitner, 782 P.2d 924, 926 (Okla. 1989)


Serving the summons warrant upon the defendant must be served by a processor with a Notice in New Jersey.



A court of justice, or judicial tribunal;​

a place of jurisdiction;​

a place where a remedy is sought; a place of litigation.​

3 Story, 347.


An attorney cannot make accusations and statements against you

when they are not representing anybody. They have to be

representing an actual injured party in order for them to make a

statement or a brief or an argument against you. If there is no

injured party.


The Plaintiff asked the judge Clement what was the cause of action in writing about a court appearance that did not exist. the judge, “if this complaint is a

civil action or criminal action?” If they say a criminal action then

demand to see the sworn statement from an injured party or

subpoena this supposed witness/or injured party to the

crime...because you have the right to face your accuser and it

cannot be a cop or attorney.



The legal principle is called corpus delicti, the body of the crime,

Who?” is the biggest question! Who accused me? Who was

injured? Who made the statement against me? Who? Who? Who?

A cop can’t be a “who”. A prosecutor can’t be a “who”. An attorney

cannot be a “who”. Please remember this. “Is this a criminal action?”

Who’s the plaintiff?” “Where’s the complaint?”


NOTICE IT DOESN’T SAY “MADE BY” AN OFFICER. ​

SOMEONE OUTSIDE OF THE GOVERNMENT ​

HAS TO MAKE THE COMPLAINT!​

A citation is not “EVIDENCE” a “crime” has been committed.​

A citation is just a summons to appear in court or answer.


An information is a written accusation made by a public prosecutor,

without the intervention of a grand jury.​

-Salvail v. Sharkey, 271 A.2d 814, 108 R.I. 63 (1970)


the corpus delicti must he proved independently of extra-judicial

confessions, and beyond reasonable doubt; and without such

proof of the corpus delicti, evidence of the confession is

inadmissible at the trial.


The corpus delicti must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt by

evidence other than such extrajudicial confessions. If there be no

evidence that a crime has been committed, it is improper to admit

upon the trial, evidence of the confession of the accused.​

-Pitts v. State, 43 Miss. 472, 2 Morr. St. Cas. 1655 (1871)


It is a well-settled principle of criminal law that a conviction for

crime cannot be had unless the corpus delicti—that is, the fact

that a crime has actually been perpetrated (the fact of injury or

harm and the existence of some person criminally responsible

therefor)—is first established by the prosecution.’​

In other words, the prosecution must establish the actual

commission, by some-one, of the particular offense charged.​

The accused is not required in any case to answer a charge

against him in the absence of evidence upon the part of the

prosecution sufficient to establish the corpus delicti...​

and if an accused is found guilty despite the failure of the

prosecution to establish the corpus delicti, the verdict may be set

aside and a new trial ordered.*

-American Jurisprudence 2D, Volume 29 Evidence​

Section 149, page 182: Corpus Delicti


-American Jurisprudence 2D, Volume 29 Evidence

Section 149, page 182: Corpus Delicti


-McCormick on Evidence 3rd edition by Edward W. Cleary (1984)

Section 145, pages 365-367



New Jersey

The term “corpus delecti” embraces occurrence of loss or injury

and criminal causation thereof.” ​

-State v. Hill, 221 A.2d. 725, 728, 47 N.J. 490.

"Proof of the corpus delicti ‐ the fact of injury or, in a homicide

case, of death, by a criminal agency ‐ may be supplied by direct or

circumstantial evidence.

-State v. Zarinsky, 362 A.2d. 611, 621. ​

"Proof of the corpus derelict is required in all criminal cases...There

are three basic elements in the proof of a crime: (1) the occurrence

of loss or injury, (2) criminal causation of that loss or injury and (3)

the identity of the defendant as the perpetrator of the crime.

However, it is firmly established in this State that the term corpus

delecti embraces only the first two of these elements‐loss or injury

and criminal causation."

-State v. Hill, 221 A.2d. 725, 728. ​

"It is true that the above care all cases of felonious homicide, but

the doctrine [of corpus delecti] is in nowise peculiar to such cases;

it is equally applicable to all criminal cases."

-State v. Gelzeiler, 128 A. 240. ​

239 Understanding The Courts

Standing in no way depends on the merits of the plaintiff’s

contention that particular conduct is illegal.”

-Watkins v. Resorts Intern. Hotel & Casino, 591 A.2d. 592, 601 (N.J.

1991). ​

Normally, an individual will only be permitted to seek judicial

vindication of his own rights.”

-State v. Norflett, 337 A.2d. 609. ​

Standing requires only a substantial likelihood of some harm

visited upon the plaintiff in the event of an unfavorable decision."

-In re Camden County, 790 A.2d. 158.

it will be helpful to define the term corpus derelict. There are three

basic elements in the proof of any crime.

First, the occurrence of loss or injury (a death in murder, a burnt

dwelling house in common law arson, etc.); ​

secondly, criminal causation of the loss or injury as opposed to

accident (i. e.j some one committed a crime),-and lastly, the

defendant’s identity or connection with the crime (i. e., that the

defendant in fact was the perpetrator of the crime)​

Dean Wigmore has suggested that in its correct meaning the term

corpus derelict has reference only to the first of these elements,

namely, the fact of the specific loss or injury sustained.

-State v. Lucas, 152 A.2d 50, 30 N.J. 37 (1959)


The municipal court is not a court of remedy the case of action taken the court is unconstitutional, which is not in conformity with the course of the common law or constitution where a court of general jurisdiction has a special authority upon it by statue, it quoad hoc, an inferior or limited court.

-Gunn V. Howell, 27 Ala. 663 (18550


Harlow vs. Fitzgerald (19820)


28 USC Paragrph 1746.

Hazel Atlas vs. Hartford (1944)


Judicial complaint if the judge ignores the perjury.


-Caperton v. Massey (2009)


Jurisdiction must be established on record

-Steel Co. V. Citizens for a Better

Evt. 523 U.S. 83 (1998)


Defendants must be tried on valid charger support by evidence.

Cole vs. Arkansas 33 U.S. 196 (1948)


Mathew v. Eldrige, 424 U.S. 319 (1976)

Goldberg vs. Kelly, 397 U.S. 234 (1970)


You cannot punish people for exercising a constitutional protect right.

-Shuttlesworth vs. Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147


Illegitimate and unconstitutional practices get their first forting in the way.

-Body vs. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886)


Ex parte McCardie, 74 U.S. 506 (1969)


Court created by statute have only powers expressly granted by law; they can not exceed their statutory authority.

-Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371 (1879)


Hodge v. Jones Holding Co.

USA LLC v Jefferson county 380 S.W. 3d 52, 63-65 (Tenn 212)


USA, LLC v. Jefferson City

Douglas v.s Straw (2024)

Scheuer vs Rhode (1974)

Milliken vs. Bradeley (1977)

Verizon Maryland, Inc. vs. Public Service Commission of Maryland (2002)


Constitution Laws


Injury in Fact

Economic injury-Spoliation of food


Access to Justice

State Power in American Federalism


State power-While the national government can exercise only such powers as are expressly or implied delegated in the constitution, state have inherent police power to act for the heath, morals, and well-being of their citizens. Such limitations may take the form of constitutional rights and liberties or limitations arising from constitutional allocation of powers.


Federalism values are reflected in the Tenth Amendment which reserves all non-delegated powers to the “state receptively, or to the people”. The majority interpretation details Federalism in favor of the national government aruging that State has only such reserved powers, which it had before ratification and that the source of National power is the people of the entire Nation.


The minority view would enlarge state power, interpreting the Tenth Amendment to limit the national government only to powers delegated by the people of each state.


All powers not delegated remain with the people of individual states, who either delegate them to the state or retain them. Where the constitution is silent, it raised no bar to action by state or the people of the states.

The rationalizing principle is that where a subject of the state regulation is by its national concerns, the states may not regulate in the absence of congressional authorization.


Primacy of Federal Regulation


When a state regulation conflicts with a federal law in a shared ares or impedes the achievement of the federal object, the federal regulation must prevail by force of the Supremacy Clause Article VI.


First Amendment rights.

-Younger vs. Harris (1971)


The principle of -Younger vs. Harris (1971) been extended to civil proceedings analogous to state criminal proceeding enjoying operation of a state public nuisance statute. Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd. (1975).


No pending proceeding where there is no pending stat court proceeding a federal court need not abstain from granting either declaratory or injunctive relief where a statute is alleged to be a vague and over brand invasion of First Amendment right s even though there is no showing of bad faith harassment. Steff vs. Thompson (1974) declaratory relief Wooley vs Maynard (1977) injunctive relief.

Unconstitutional Official Acts

A suit for injunctive relief again a state officer acting unconstitutionally or contrary to a statute is not suit against the stat and Eleventh is therefor not a bar. Ex parte Young (1908)


The Eleventh Amendment does bar a suit against state official where the official action violates only state law-federal court review is not assure supremacy of federal law. -Pennhurst State School and Hopsital vs. Holderman (1984)


Marbury vs. Madison, retroactively require an Article 3 court to reopen final decision in violation this case law.

-Plait vs. Spend Thrift Farm Inc. (1995)


The Supremacy Clause

Article VI, Cl. 2 provides, This Constitution and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all treaties made, or which shall be made under the Authority of the United States, shall be the Supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges is every state shall be bound there by, anything in the Constitution or Laws of any State to Contrary not withstanding. Under this critical clause, a constitutional exercise of the national legislative poser can operate to override contrary state law.


Traditional Equal Protection,

Mobile vs. Bolden (1980)


State Statute on Equal Protection Clause. Hunter vs. Underwood (1985)

It is original enactment was motivated by a desire to discriminate againt blacks on account of race and the provision continue to have a racially discriminatory impact today. Racial impact intent of disenfranchising blacks Hunter vs. Underwood (1985).


Mc Cleskey vs. Kemp (1987)


Check a case law for Federal lawsuits claiming statutory and constitutional violation.


In re Griffiths (1973) Safeguarding of its interests.


Bernal vs. Fainter (1984)


Preemption Article VI Supremacy Clause.


Equal Protection Clause access of justice under fundamental rights and interests.


Shapiro vs. Thompson (1969)


Did the municipal court violates due process and equal protection when he did not dismissed the case due to no show of cause case, and Motion to challenge jurisdiction?


The Original Constitution – Express Rights contained few express rights. Article 1, 9.


Federalist argue that since this is a government of limited power. No specification of rights was necessary. Further, they argued that inclusion of some rights might be used to deny other rights not enumerate or provide a basis of federal government claiming powers beyond those delegated.

The Taking Clause

Naomi’s private owned conveyance property constitution text Fifth Amendment provides that private property is not to be taken for public use without just compensation. A principal purpose of the taking clause is to bar government from forcing some people alone to bear public burden which in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole. Armstrong to United States 1960.

Agins vs. City of Tburon (1980)

The state law of property or nuisance had previously limite the ownership of the properly -Lucas vs. South Carolina Coastal Council (1992).

Unconstitutional condition doctrine. “The government may not require a person to give up a constitutional right. Dolan vs. City of Tigard (1994)

Traditional substantive due process. Based on the common law were almost presumptive unconstitutional. The police and court intruded on Naomi’s substantive economic concept such as freedom.

Express right, implied and enumerated rights. Significant liberty interest by the due process clause.


Proceures Required

Second, in the particular factual context what procedures are required to assure fundamental fairness. Putting people race does not show fairness.

Violation equal protection of law.


Constitutional: Clause- The other clause the municipal state and traffic court is not court. They are bond by the Republic Guarantee Article 4 section 4. The United State shall guarantee all the states in it union a republic form of government require separation of powers, due process of law, trial by jury and independent courts of records. They violate of these There is no fare haring.

The police infringe on my 14th Amendment violation when they stop Plaintiff and seizure you without a suspicious of a crime. This court has interesting to make revenue not justice.

The 6th Amendment violated because we see these administrative hearing. We are unable to confront our accuser. It is supposed to be an affidavit with an inured party. The stat supposed to be protector our rights.

The 7th Amendment violation by re-labeling a lot of these fine as civil so they try to tell you that they don’t have to give you a jury trial. Under the constitution we are guarantee that.

The defendant violating the constitution serveral provision rights they are sworn an oath by to up hold the New Jersey and United State Constitution.


Article 3 Section 2 destroy their jurisdiction in many ways. The guarantee clause.


Article 4 exposed their fraud it is a fire wall. Each public official needs to held accountable of their action.


Article 3 standing based on their showing that they had a resonable (not merely subjective).


Causation-Fairly Traceable

Warth vs Seldin (1975)

Allen vs. Wright (1984)


Individual rights and liberties

State Action-civil rights cases (1883)

Civil rights law 42 USC 1988

How to Stop Cops From Using This NEW Tech to Spy on You And How to FOOL Police AI Cameras

 





SCOTUS_Cert_Petition_DRAFT

 Supreme Court of the United States

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF TEXAS 

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI




THE CRUX OF THE MATTER This case is not fundamentally about property taxation. Nor is it solely about appraisal methodology, overvaluation, or administrative error. At its constitutional core, this case presents a structural question of national importance: Whether a State may design procedural architecture such that federal constitutional claims are never heard by any tribunal possessing authority to grant meaningful relief. If that is permissible, constitutional rights become contingent not upon supreme federal law, but upon state procedural design. That result is incompatible with Article III, the Supremacy Clause, and the Due Process Clause. Texas created a constitutional architecture of non-adjudication.


QUESTIONS PRESENTED 1. Whether the Supremacy Clause permits a State, through a statutory “exclusive remedy,” to route a federal constitutional claim into an administrative tribunal that has no power to grant the relief the claim requires, so that the claim can never be adjudicated in any forum and the responsible state official is, in effect, immunized from federal law. 

2. Whether a State’s “exclusive remedy” property-tax statute may bar an owner’s federal takings and due process challenge to a mass-appraisal method that the State’s own law makes mandatory, where the designated administrative forum cannot adjudicate the federal claim or grant the prospective relief sought.


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Texas Legislature

 Texas Legislature

To: Members of the Texas House of Representatives and the Texas Senate From: A Constituent Date: July 5, 2026 Subject: A Concurrent Resolution to Halt State-Approved Training That Teaches Violation of Texas Law and Results in Mass Incarceration and Official Oppression

TABLE OF CONTENTS

The Texas Legislature has already written every statute needed to prevent mass incarceration and official oppression. …………………….. Executive SummaryX

State-approved training has created a pipeline from the classroom to the jail cell. ……………………………………………….. Section I

Six Statutory Commands That Training Has Replaced with Illegal Practices. ……………………………………………….. Section II

The Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article Fifteen Point One Six commands officers to take arrestees before a magistrate without unnecessary delay. ……………………………………………….. Section II.A

The Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article Fourteen Point Zero Six imposes the same mandatory duty for arrests without a warrant. ……………………………………………….. Section II.B

The Texas Transportation Code Section Five Hundred Forty Three Point Zero Zero Two requires the nearest magistrate for traffic arrests. ……………………………………………….. Section II.C

The Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article Fifteen Point Zero Nine commands magistrates to issue warrants upon receiving a proper complaint. ……………………………………………….. Section II.D

The Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article Eleven Point Zero Five makes habeas corpus a mandatory judicial duty. ……………………………………………….. Section II.E

The Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article Twenty A Point Zero Five One commands grand juries to inquire into all offenses. ……………………………………………….. Section II.F

The Texas Government Code Section Five Hundred Fifty Two Point Three Two One Five Subsection E requires Public Information Act complaints against prosecutors to be filed with the Attorney General. ……………………………………………….. Section II.G

The Texas Penal Code Section Thirty Nine Point Zero Three defines official oppression as intentionally unlawful detention by a public servant. ……………………………………………….. Section II.H

The Constitutional Authority and Duty of the Legislature to Intervene. ……………………………………………….. Section III

The Texas Constitution vests all legislative power in the Legislature, and the other branches may not ignore the statutes the Legislature enacts. ……………………………………………….. Section III.A

The separation of powers doctrine protects legislative supremacy, not executive or judicial independence from law. ……………………………………………….. Section III.B

The Legislature has exclusive authority to define crimes, and when the bench and bar ignore that definition, they violate expressed legislative intent. ……………………………………………….. Section III.C

A concurrent resolution making formal legislative findings is the proper constitutional vehicle for the Legislature to declare that these practices must end. ……………………………………………….. Section III.D

Proposed Concurrent Resolution Language. ……………………………………………….. Section IV

Conclusion and Next Steps. ……………………………………………….. Section V

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

STATUTES

Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article 11.05 ………………………………. Section II.E Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article 14.06(a) …………………………… Section II.B Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article 15.09 …………………………… Section II.D Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article 15.16(a) …………………………… Section II.A Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article 20A.051 …………………………… Section II.F Texas Government Code § 552.3215(e) …………………………………….. Section II.G Texas Penal Code § 39.03 ……………………………………………….. Section II.H Texas Transportation Code § 543.002 …………………………………….. Section II.CX

CASES

Eric D. Neil v. State, No. 10-16-00331-CR, 2017 Tex. App. LEXIS 8863 (Tex. App.—Waco Sep. 20, 2017) ……………………………………………….. Section III.CX

In Re Allcat Claims Service, L.P. and John Weakly, 356 S.W.3d 455 (Tex. 2011) ……………………………………………….. Section III.B

State v. Hall, 829 S.W.2d 184 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992) ……………………………………………….. Section III.C

State v. Rhine, 297 S.W.3d 301 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) ……………………………………………….. Section III.A

OTHER AUTHORITIES

Tex. Const. art. II, § 1 ……………………………………………….. Section III.B Tex. Const. art. III, § 1 ……………………………………………….. Section III.A Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. No. MW-261 (1980) ……………………………………………….. Section III.BX

Executive Summary

The Legislature has written every law needed

The Texas Legislature has already written every statute needed to prevent mass incarceration and official oppression. The Texas Penal Code and the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure form a fine mosaic of interlocking commands. These laws require officers to take arrestees directly to a magistrate. They require magistrates to issue warrants and writs of habeas corpus on proper application. And they command grand juries to inquire into all offenses. If these laws were followed as written, the “school-to-prison pipeline” would not exist, because state actors would lack the legal authority to create it. A problem now exists.

State-approved training teaches violation of the law

The problem is that state-approved training teaches law enforcement, prosecutors, and even judicial officers to ignore these statutory commands. Instead of taking arrestees to the nearest magistrate as the law requires, officers are trained to take them to a centralized county jail. Instead of issuing warrants on probable cause, magistrates are trained to defer to prosecutorial discretion. Instead of inquiring into all offenses, grand juries are trained to act as a rubber stamp for the district attorney. This training, delivered under the authority of the State of Texas, has created a system where the plain text of the law is routinely violated, resulting in unlawful detentions that constitute the state-law crime of official oppression.

The Legislature’s constitutional duty to intervene

The Texas Constitution vests all legislative power in the Legislature. The executive and judicial branches are constitutionally bound to follow the laws the Legislature enacts. When these branches ignore statutory commands, they violate the separation of powers. It is not an “interference” for the Legislature to demand that its laws be followed; it is the Legislature’s constitutional duty to preserve the balance of powers by ensuring the other branches operate within their lawful bounds. This white paper details the specific statutory violations, confirms the Legislature’s authority to intervene, and proposes the text of a concurrent resolution to restore the rule of law.

Section I. State-approved training has created a pipeline from the classroom to the jail cell.

A system that bypasses the magistrate

The Texas Legislature designed a system where a neutral and detached magistrate stands as a gatekeeper between the citizen and the jail cell. The Code of Criminal Procedure repeatedly commands that an arrested person must be taken “without unnecessary delay” before the “nearest or most accessible” magistrate. The magistrate’s duty is to determine if probable cause exists to believe an offense was committed. Without that independent finding, detention is unlawful. This structure protects citizens from arbitrary arrest and ensures that only those against whom there is actual evidence are deprived of their liberty. This statutory framework is not a suggestion. It is a command.

The classroom-to-jailhouse pipeline

State-approved training has dismantled this system. Law enforcement officers are now trained in a procedure that violates the plain text of the law. Instead of taking an arrestee to the nearest magistrate, they are taught to transport the person directly to a centralized county jail for “processing” and “booking.” The magistrate is bypassed entirely. This practice is not an isolated error; it is a systemic procedure taught in state-sanctioned academies. The consequence is that thousands of Texans are held in jail cells, sometimes for days, without the probable cause determination that the Legislature made a mandatory prerequisite for detention. This pipeline from the classroom to the jailhouse is a direct result of training that treats the Legislature’s commands as optional.

This pipeline flows into the courtroom

The same dynamic infects the rest of the system. Magistrates are trained to defer to prosecutors before issuing warrants, though the statute commands them to act upon receiving a sufficient complaint. Grand juries are trained to believe they work for the district attorney, though the statute commands them to be an independent body that “shall inquire into all offenses.” Prosecutors are trained to withhold public records, like the names of grand jurors, even when no statute permits the secrecy. Each of these practices, born of state-approved training, inverts the system the Legislature created. It replaces a system of checks and balances with a system of collusion, where the rights of the citizen are subordinated to the convenience of the state actor.

Section II. Six Statutory Commands That Training Has Replaced with Illegal Practices.

A. The Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article Fifteen Point One Six commands officers to take arrestees before a magistrate without unnecessary delay.

The Legislature’s command for arrests made with a warrant is absolute. Officers must take the person before the magistrate who issued the warrant, or another magistrate in the same county if the first is unavailable. The statute provides no exception for “booking” or “processing” at a jail. The exact text of Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article 15.16(a) states:X

(a) The officer arresting a person under a warrant of arrest shall without unnecessary delay take the person or have the person taken before the magistrate who issued the warrant or, if the magistrate is not available, before the most accessible magistrate in the same county as the magistrate who issued the warrant.”

Training that directs an officer to take an arrestee to a jail instead of the magistrate teaches a direct violation of this statute.

B. The Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article Fourteen Point Zero Six imposes the same mandatory duty for arrests without a warrant.

For arrests made without a warrant, the Legislature imposed the same mandatory duty. The arresting officer must take the person before a magistrate for a probable cause determination. The law provides a maximum time limit of 48 hours, but it does not permit any “unnecessary delay” within that period. The exact text of Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article 14.06(a) states:X

(a) …the person making the arrest or the person having custody of the person arrested shall without unnecessary delay, but not later than 48 hours after the person is arrested, take the person arrested or have the person arrested taken before some magistrate of the county where the person was arrested…”

Training that treats the 48-hour period as a grace period for administrative convenience, rather than an outer limit constrained by the “without unnecessary delay” command, teaches a violation of this statute.

C. The Texas Transportation Code Section Five Hundred Forty Three Point Zero Zero Two requires the nearest magistrate for traffic arrests.

The Legislature provided even more specific instructions for arrests arising from traffic offenses. The law explicitly commands that the arrested person be taken before a magistrate who is the “nearest or most accessible to the place of arrest.” This language leaves no room for interpretation or discretion. The exact text of Texas Transportation Code § 543.002 states:X

(a) A peace officer who arrests a person for a violation of this subtitle punishable as a misdemeanor shall immediately take the person before a magistrate… (b) The person must be taken before a magistrate who: (1) has jurisdiction of the offense; (2) is in the county in which the offense charged is alleged to have been committed; and (3) is nearest or most accessible to the place of arrest.

Training that directs an officer to transport a person arrested for a traffic offense to a centralized county jail, bypassing nearer and more accessible magistrates, teaches a direct and unambiguous violation of this statute.

D. The Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article Fifteen Point Zero Nine commands magistrates to issue warrants upon receiving a proper complaint.

The Legislature commanded magistrates to issue warrants upon the filing of a sworn complaint that establishes probable cause. The statute uses the mandatory term “shall.” It does not grant the magistrate discretion to consult with or defer to a prosecutor. The exact text of Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article 15.09 states:X

If the magistrate be satisfied from the complaint that the offense charged has been committed, he shall issue a warrant for the arrest of the accused.”

Training that instructs magistrates to wait for a prosecutor’s approval before issuing a warrant, or to refuse a valid complaint from a citizen, teaches a violation of this statute.

E. The Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article Eleven Point Zero Five makes habeas corpus a mandatory judicial duty.

The Legislature made clear that the Great Writ of Habeas Corpus is not a discretionary tool. The statute commands that it is the “duty of the court” to grant the writ “on proper application.” The Legislature did not create procedural loopholes or grant judges the power to deny the writ based on local rules or preferences. The exact text of Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article 11.05 states:X

The writ of habeas corpus is a writ of right and shall never be suspended. It is the duty of the court or judge on proper application to issue the writ under the rules prescribed by law.”

Training that encourages judges to deny or delay habeas applications based on procedural technicalities not found in the statute teaches a violation of this fundamental command.

F. The Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article Twenty A Point Zero Five One commands grand juries to inquire into all offenses.

The Legislature established the grand jury as an independent investigative body of the people, not an arm of the prosecutor’s office. The statute commands that the grand jury “shall inquire into all offenses.” This is not a suggestion; it is a duty. The law does not state that the grand jury may only inquire into cases brought by the district attorney. The exact text of Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article 20A.051 states:X

The grand jury shall inquire into all offenses liable to indictment of which any grand juror may have knowledge or of which the grand jury is informed by the attorney representing the state or by any other credible person.”

Training that teaches grand jurors that they are subordinate to the district attorney, or that they may not pursue investigations of their own accord, teaches a violation of this statute.

G. The Texas Government Code Section Five Hundred Fifty Two Point Three Two One Five Subsection E requires Public Information Act complaints against prosecutors to be filed with the Attorney General.

The Legislature created a specific enforcement mechanism for when a district attorney or other prosecutor violates the Public Information Act. A person who believes a prosecutor has failed to comply with the act can file a complaint with the Attorney General. The exact text of Texas Government Code § 552.3215(e) states:X

(e) A person who claims to be the victim of a violation of this chapter by an officer for public information of a… district attorney, criminal district attorney, or county attorney may file a complaint with the attorney general.”

Training that teaches prosecutors they can deny requests for public information, such as grand juror names, without citing a specific statutory exemption or requesting an Attorney General opinion, encourages violation of the Public Information Act and subverts the enforcement mechanism the Legislature created.

H. The Texas Penal Code Section Thirty Nine Point Zero Three defines official oppression as intentionally unlawful detention by a public servant.

The Legislature defined the crime of official oppression with great clarity. When a public servant, acting under color of office, intentionally subjects another to unlawful detention, that public servant has committed a Class A misdemeanor. The exact text of Texas Penal Code § 39.03 states:X

(a) A public servant acting under color of his office or employment commits an offense if he: (1) intentionally subjects another to mistreatment or to arrest, detention, search, seizure, dispossession, assessment, or lien that he knows is unlawful…”

When a peace officer, following training that violates the Code of Criminal Procedure, takes an arrestee to jail instead of a magistrate, that detention is unlawful. Because the training is systemic and the statutes are clear, the act is intentional. This practice, taught in state-approved classrooms, is the literal definition of official oppression.

Section III. The Constitutional Authority and Duty of the Legislature to Intervene.

A. The Texas Constitution vests all legislative power in the Legislature, and the other branches may not ignore the statutes the Legislature enacts.

The Texas Constitution is unambiguous. It creates three distinct branches of government and assigns each its own power. Article III, Section 1 vests “all legislative power” in the Legislature. The power to write the law belongs to the Legislature alone. The executive branch must enforce the law as written. The judicial branch must apply the law as written. As the Court of Criminal Appeals held in State v. Rhine, “The Texas Constitution vests lawmaking power in the legislature… Only the legislature can exercise that power.” When executive agencies or judicial officers adopt practices that contradict the plain text of a statute, they are exercising a legislative power they do not possess.X

B. The separation of powers doctrine protects legislative supremacy, not executive or judicial independence from law.

The doctrine of separation of powers, found in Article II, Section 1 of the Texas Constitution, is not a shield for the other branches to hide behind when they disobey the law. It is a sword for the Legislature to wield to protect its exclusive lawmaking authority. As a Texas Supreme Court justice wrote in the dissent in In Re Allcat Claims Service, “if the Separation of Powers provision means anything, it is that the Executive must enforce the laws that the Legislature passes.” A 1980 Texas Attorney General Opinion confirmed this, stating, “If one branch exceeds its authority and usurps powers which it does not possess, its acts are a nullity.” A legislative resolution demanding compliance is not an interference; it is a constitutional course correction.X

C. The Legislature has exclusive authority to define crimes, and when the bench and bar ignore that definition, they violate expressed legislative intent.

The Legislature has the sole power to define what constitutes a crime in Texas. As the Court of Appeals held in Eric D. Neil v. State, “The legislature has the exclusive authority to define crimes.” When the Legislature defines official oppression in the Penal Code, that definition is the law. It is not a guideline that can be overridden by “standard procedure” or “prosecutorial discretion.” As the Court of Criminal Appeals noted in State v. Hall, for the bench and bar to use a different definition of misconduct than the one the Legislature wrote “would appear to be contrary to expressed legislative intent.” The current training regimen teaches a practice that the Legislature has already defined as a crime.X

D. A concurrent resolution making formal legislative findings is the proper constitutional vehicle for the Legislature to declare that these practices must end.

The Legislature has the authority and the precedent to address this crisis through a concurrent resolution. While such a resolution does not amend the law, it does not need to—the law is already clear. A concurrent resolution serves as a formal declaration of legislative findings and intent. It puts the executive and judicial branches on notice that the Legislature is aware of the systemic violation of its statutes and that it considers these practices to be contrary to the law of Texas. It provides a clear statement that can be used in court to challenge these unlawful practices and to hold public servants accountable for official oppression. The Legislature has used this tool before to direct state agencies to comply with existing statutes, and it must use it now to restore the rule of law.

Section IV. Proposed Concurrent Resolution Language.

A CONCURRENT RESOLUTION of the 89th Texas Legislature, making formal findings that certain law enforcement, prosecutorial, and judicial practices and procedures are not in concert with standing law, and asserting the intent of the Legislature that all such practices and procedures be adjusted to comply with the law as enacted.

WHEREAS, The Constitution of the State of Texas vests all legislative power in the Legislature, and the duty of the executive and judicial branches is to faithfully execute and apply the laws as enacted by the Legislature; and

WHEREAS, The Legislature of the State of Texas has enacted a comprehensive and interlocking body of law governing criminal procedure, the conduct of public servants, and the rights of the people, including the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, the Texas Transportation Code, and the Texas Penal Code; and

WHEREAS, Specific practices, taught and promulgated through state-approved training, have been brought to the Legislature’s attention that are inconsistent with the plain text of existing statutes, thereby undermining the rule of law and the separation of powers; now, therefore, be it

RESOLVED, That the Legislature of the State of Texas makes the following formal findings:

FINDING: The practice of transporting arrested persons to a jail for booking or processing before taking them to a magistrate for a probable cause determination violates the “without unnecessary delay” command of Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Articles 15.16(a) and 14.06(a), and the “nearest or most accessible” magistrate command of Texas Transportation Code § 543.002.

FINDING: The practice of magistrates deferring to prosecutorial discretion before issuing a warrant violates the mandatory duty to “issue a warrant” upon a sufficient complaint under Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article 15.09.

FINDING: The practice of courts denying or delaying writs of habeas corpus on procedural grounds not found in statute violates the mandatory “duty of the court… to issue the writ” under Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article 11.05.

FINDING: The practice of grand juries acting as a subordinate body to the district attorney, rather than an independent investigative body, violates the command that the grand jury “shall inquire into all offenses” under Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article 20A.051.

FINDING: The practice of prosecutors denying Public Information Act requests without citing a specific statutory exemption or seeking an Attorney General opinion subverts the enforcement mechanism of Texas Government Code § 552.3215(e).

FINDING: The practice of intentionally detaining a person in a manner known to be unlawful, such as detaining them without a prompt magistration as required by law, constitutes the Class A misdemeanor of Official Oppression as defined by Texas Penal Code § 39.03.

BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED, That it is the intent of the Legislature that all Texas law enforcement agencies, district attorneys, courts, and judicial officers shall immediately review and adjust their practices and procedures to comply scrupulously with the statutes cited herein as written; and, be it

BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED, That any practice, policy, or training curriculum inconsistent with the plain text of these statutes is not in concert with the law of this State and is contrary to the expressed will of the Legislature; and, be it

BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED, That the Secretary of State forward official copies of this resolution to the Attorney General of Texas, the Director of the Department of Public Safety, the Executive Director of the Texas Commission on Law Enforcement, the Texas Judicial Council, and the district and county attorneys of this State, with the instruction that it be distributed to all relevant personnel.

Section V. Conclusion and Next Steps.

The law is clear and the crisis is real

The law is not the problem. The Texas Legislature has provided a clear, effective, and just framework for criminal procedure. The problem is a culture of non-compliance, fostered by state-approved training that teaches public servants to violate the very laws they have sworn to uphold. This has created a crisis that fills our jails with people who have not had a probable cause determination, that shields official misconduct from grand jury review, and that erodes the public trust upon which our system of justice depends. This is not a partisan issue; it is a constitutional crisis that strikes at the heart of the rule of law.

A resolution is the first step

A concurrent resolution is the necessary first step. It is a declaration by the lawmaking body of this State that the law is not a set of suggestions. It is a command. Passing this resolution will reassert the Legislature’s constitutional authority, put state actors on formal notice that their illegal practices must end, and equip citizens and attorneys with the clear statement of legislative intent they need to defend their rights in court. We urge you to sponsor and support this resolution and to begin the urgent work of restoring the fine mosaic of Texas law to its rightful place as the supreme guide for the conduct of our government.