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SCOTUS_Cert_Petition_DRAFT

 Supreme Court of the United States

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF TEXAS 

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

THE CRUX OF THE MATTER This case is not fundamentally about property taxation. Nor is it solely about appraisal methodology, overvaluation, or administrative error. At its constitutional core, this case presents a structural question of national importance: Whether a State may design procedural architecture such that federal constitutional claims are never heard by any tribunal possessing authority to grant meaningful relief. If that is permissible, constitutional rights become contingent not upon supreme federal law, but upon state procedural design. That result is incompatible with Article III, the Supremacy Clause, and the Due Process Clause. Texas created a constitutional architecture of non-adjudication.

QUESTIONS PRESENTED 1. Whether the Supremacy Clause permits a State, through a statutory “exclusive remedy,” to route a federal constitutional claim into an administrative tribunal that has no power to grant the relief the claim requires, so that the claim can never be adjudicated in any forum and the responsible state official is, in effect, immunized from federal law. 

2. Whether a State’s “exclusive remedy” property-tax statute may bar an owner’s federal takings and due process challenge to a mass-appraisal method that the State’s own law makes mandatory, where the designated administrative forum cannot adjudicate the federal claim or grant the prospective relief sought.

Click this word CERTIORARI to read more.

file:///home/justice/Downloads/Vexler_SCOTUS_Cert_Petition_DRAFT+for+Solicitor+General+Sauer+P.pdf

Texas Legislature

 Texas Legislature

To: Members of the Texas House of Representatives and the Texas Senate From: A Constituent Date: July 5, 2026 Subject: A Concurrent Resolution to Halt State-Approved Training That Teaches Violation of Texas Law and Results in Mass Incarceration and Official Oppression

TABLE OF CONTENTS

The Texas Legislature has already written every statute needed to prevent mass incarceration and official oppression. …………………….. Executive SummaryX

State-approved training has created a pipeline from the classroom to the jail cell. ……………………………………………….. Section I

Six Statutory Commands That Training Has Replaced with Illegal Practices. ……………………………………………….. Section II

The Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article Fifteen Point One Six commands officers to take arrestees before a magistrate without unnecessary delay. ……………………………………………….. Section II.A

The Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article Fourteen Point Zero Six imposes the same mandatory duty for arrests without a warrant. ……………………………………………….. Section II.B

The Texas Transportation Code Section Five Hundred Forty Three Point Zero Zero Two requires the nearest magistrate for traffic arrests. ……………………………………………….. Section II.C

The Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article Fifteen Point Zero Nine commands magistrates to issue warrants upon receiving a proper complaint. ……………………………………………….. Section II.D

The Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article Eleven Point Zero Five makes habeas corpus a mandatory judicial duty. ……………………………………………….. Section II.E

The Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article Twenty A Point Zero Five One commands grand juries to inquire into all offenses. ……………………………………………….. Section II.F

The Texas Government Code Section Five Hundred Fifty Two Point Three Two One Five Subsection E requires Public Information Act complaints against prosecutors to be filed with the Attorney General. ……………………………………………….. Section II.G

The Texas Penal Code Section Thirty Nine Point Zero Three defines official oppression as intentionally unlawful detention by a public servant. ……………………………………………….. Section II.H

The Constitutional Authority and Duty of the Legislature to Intervene. ……………………………………………….. Section III

The Texas Constitution vests all legislative power in the Legislature, and the other branches may not ignore the statutes the Legislature enacts. ……………………………………………….. Section III.A

The separation of powers doctrine protects legislative supremacy, not executive or judicial independence from law. ……………………………………………….. Section III.B

The Legislature has exclusive authority to define crimes, and when the bench and bar ignore that definition, they violate expressed legislative intent. ……………………………………………….. Section III.C

A concurrent resolution making formal legislative findings is the proper constitutional vehicle for the Legislature to declare that these practices must end. ……………………………………………….. Section III.D

Proposed Concurrent Resolution Language. ……………………………………………….. Section IV

Conclusion and Next Steps. ……………………………………………….. Section V

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

STATUTES

Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article 11.05 ………………………………. Section II.E Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article 14.06(a) …………………………… Section II.B Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article 15.09 …………………………… Section II.D Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article 15.16(a) …………………………… Section II.A Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article 20A.051 …………………………… Section II.F Texas Government Code § 552.3215(e) …………………………………….. Section II.G Texas Penal Code § 39.03 ……………………………………………….. Section II.H Texas Transportation Code § 543.002 …………………………………….. Section II.CX

CASES

Eric D. Neil v. State, No. 10-16-00331-CR, 2017 Tex. App. LEXIS 8863 (Tex. App.—Waco Sep. 20, 2017) ……………………………………………….. Section III.CX

In Re Allcat Claims Service, L.P. and John Weakly, 356 S.W.3d 455 (Tex. 2011) ……………………………………………….. Section III.B

State v. Hall, 829 S.W.2d 184 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992) ……………………………………………….. Section III.C

State v. Rhine, 297 S.W.3d 301 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) ……………………………………………….. Section III.A

OTHER AUTHORITIES

Tex. Const. art. II, § 1 ……………………………………………….. Section III.B Tex. Const. art. III, § 1 ……………………………………………….. Section III.A Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. No. MW-261 (1980) ……………………………………………….. Section III.BX

Executive Summary

The Legislature has written every law needed

The Texas Legislature has already written every statute needed to prevent mass incarceration and official oppression. The Texas Penal Code and the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure form a fine mosaic of interlocking commands. These laws require officers to take arrestees directly to a magistrate. They require magistrates to issue warrants and writs of habeas corpus on proper application. And they command grand juries to inquire into all offenses. If these laws were followed as written, the “school-to-prison pipeline” would not exist, because state actors would lack the legal authority to create it. A problem now exists.

State-approved training teaches violation of the law

The problem is that state-approved training teaches law enforcement, prosecutors, and even judicial officers to ignore these statutory commands. Instead of taking arrestees to the nearest magistrate as the law requires, officers are trained to take them to a centralized county jail. Instead of issuing warrants on probable cause, magistrates are trained to defer to prosecutorial discretion. Instead of inquiring into all offenses, grand juries are trained to act as a rubber stamp for the district attorney. This training, delivered under the authority of the State of Texas, has created a system where the plain text of the law is routinely violated, resulting in unlawful detentions that constitute the state-law crime of official oppression.

The Legislature’s constitutional duty to intervene

The Texas Constitution vests all legislative power in the Legislature. The executive and judicial branches are constitutionally bound to follow the laws the Legislature enacts. When these branches ignore statutory commands, they violate the separation of powers. It is not an “interference” for the Legislature to demand that its laws be followed; it is the Legislature’s constitutional duty to preserve the balance of powers by ensuring the other branches operate within their lawful bounds. This white paper details the specific statutory violations, confirms the Legislature’s authority to intervene, and proposes the text of a concurrent resolution to restore the rule of law.

Section I. State-approved training has created a pipeline from the classroom to the jail cell.

A system that bypasses the magistrate

The Texas Legislature designed a system where a neutral and detached magistrate stands as a gatekeeper between the citizen and the jail cell. The Code of Criminal Procedure repeatedly commands that an arrested person must be taken “without unnecessary delay” before the “nearest or most accessible” magistrate. The magistrate’s duty is to determine if probable cause exists to believe an offense was committed. Without that independent finding, detention is unlawful. This structure protects citizens from arbitrary arrest and ensures that only those against whom there is actual evidence are deprived of their liberty. This statutory framework is not a suggestion. It is a command.

The classroom-to-jailhouse pipeline

State-approved training has dismantled this system. Law enforcement officers are now trained in a procedure that violates the plain text of the law. Instead of taking an arrestee to the nearest magistrate, they are taught to transport the person directly to a centralized county jail for “processing” and “booking.” The magistrate is bypassed entirely. This practice is not an isolated error; it is a systemic procedure taught in state-sanctioned academies. The consequence is that thousands of Texans are held in jail cells, sometimes for days, without the probable cause determination that the Legislature made a mandatory prerequisite for detention. This pipeline from the classroom to the jailhouse is a direct result of training that treats the Legislature’s commands as optional.

This pipeline flows into the courtroom

The same dynamic infects the rest of the system. Magistrates are trained to defer to prosecutors before issuing warrants, though the statute commands them to act upon receiving a sufficient complaint. Grand juries are trained to believe they work for the district attorney, though the statute commands them to be an independent body that “shall inquire into all offenses.” Prosecutors are trained to withhold public records, like the names of grand jurors, even when no statute permits the secrecy. Each of these practices, born of state-approved training, inverts the system the Legislature created. It replaces a system of checks and balances with a system of collusion, where the rights of the citizen are subordinated to the convenience of the state actor.

Section II. Six Statutory Commands That Training Has Replaced with Illegal Practices.

A. The Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article Fifteen Point One Six commands officers to take arrestees before a magistrate without unnecessary delay.

The Legislature’s command for arrests made with a warrant is absolute. Officers must take the person before the magistrate who issued the warrant, or another magistrate in the same county if the first is unavailable. The statute provides no exception for “booking” or “processing” at a jail. The exact text of Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article 15.16(a) states:X

“(a) The officer arresting a person under a warrant of arrest shall without unnecessary delay take the person or have the person taken before the magistrate who issued the warrant or, if the magistrate is not available, before the most accessible magistrate in the same county as the magistrate who issued the warrant.”

Training that directs an officer to take an arrestee to a jail instead of the magistrate teaches a direct violation of this statute.

B. The Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article Fourteen Point Zero Six imposes the same mandatory duty for arrests without a warrant.

For arrests made without a warrant, the Legislature imposed the same mandatory duty. The arresting officer must take the person before a magistrate for a probable cause determination. The law provides a maximum time limit of 48 hours, but it does not permit any “unnecessary delay” within that period. The exact text of Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article 14.06(a) states:X

“(a) …the person making the arrest or the person having custody of the person arrested shall without unnecessary delay, but not later than 48 hours after the person is arrested, take the person arrested or have the person arrested taken before some magistrate of the county where the person was arrested…”

Training that treats the 48-hour period as a grace period for administrative convenience, rather than an outer limit constrained by the “without unnecessary delay” command, teaches a violation of this statute.

C. The Texas Transportation Code Section Five Hundred Forty Three Point Zero Zero Two requires the nearest magistrate for traffic arrests.

The Legislature provided even more specific instructions for arrests arising from traffic offenses. The law explicitly commands that the arrested person be taken before a magistrate who is the “nearest or most accessible to the place of arrest.” This language leaves no room for interpretation or discretion. The exact text of Texas Transportation Code § 543.002 states:X

“(a) A peace officer who arrests a person for a violation of this subtitle punishable as a misdemeanor shall immediately take the person before a magistrate… (b) The person must be taken before a magistrate who: (1) has jurisdiction of the offense; (2) is in the county in which the offense charged is alleged to have been committed; and (3) is nearest or most accessible to the place of arrest.”

Training that directs an officer to transport a person arrested for a traffic offense to a centralized county jail, bypassing nearer and more accessible magistrates, teaches a direct and unambiguous violation of this statute.

D. The Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article Fifteen Point Zero Nine commands magistrates to issue warrants upon receiving a proper complaint.

The Legislature commanded magistrates to issue warrants upon the filing of a sworn complaint that establishes probable cause. The statute uses the mandatory term “shall.” It does not grant the magistrate discretion to consult with or defer to a prosecutor. The exact text of Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article 15.09 states:X

“If the magistrate be satisfied from the complaint that the offense charged has been committed, he shall issue a warrant for the arrest of the accused.”

Training that instructs magistrates to wait for a prosecutor’s approval before issuing a warrant, or to refuse a valid complaint from a citizen, teaches a violation of this statute.

E. The Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article Eleven Point Zero Five makes habeas corpus a mandatory judicial duty.

The Legislature made clear that the Great Writ of Habeas Corpus is not a discretionary tool. The statute commands that it is the “duty of the court” to grant the writ “on proper application.” The Legislature did not create procedural loopholes or grant judges the power to deny the writ based on local rules or preferences. The exact text of Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article 11.05 states:X

“The writ of habeas corpus is a writ of right and shall never be suspended. It is the duty of the court or judge on proper application to issue the writ under the rules prescribed by law.”

Training that encourages judges to deny or delay habeas applications based on procedural technicalities not found in the statute teaches a violation of this fundamental command.

F. The Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article Twenty A Point Zero Five One commands grand juries to inquire into all offenses.

The Legislature established the grand jury as an independent investigative body of the people, not an arm of the prosecutor’s office. The statute commands that the grand jury “shall inquire into all offenses.” This is not a suggestion; it is a duty. The law does not state that the grand jury may only inquire into cases brought by the district attorney. The exact text of Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article 20A.051 states:X

“The grand jury shall inquire into all offenses liable to indictment of which any grand juror may have knowledge or of which the grand jury is informed by the attorney representing the state or by any other credible person.”

Training that teaches grand jurors that they are subordinate to the district attorney, or that they may not pursue investigations of their own accord, teaches a violation of this statute.

G. The Texas Government Code Section Five Hundred Fifty Two Point Three Two One Five Subsection E requires Public Information Act complaints against prosecutors to be filed with the Attorney General.

The Legislature created a specific enforcement mechanism for when a district attorney or other prosecutor violates the Public Information Act. A person who believes a prosecutor has failed to comply with the act can file a complaint with the Attorney General. The exact text of Texas Government Code § 552.3215(e) states:X

“(e) A person who claims to be the victim of a violation of this chapter by an officer for public information of a… district attorney, criminal district attorney, or county attorney may file a complaint with the attorney general.”

Training that teaches prosecutors they can deny requests for public information, such as grand juror names, without citing a specific statutory exemption or requesting an Attorney General opinion, encourages violation of the Public Information Act and subverts the enforcement mechanism the Legislature created.

H. The Texas Penal Code Section Thirty Nine Point Zero Three defines official oppression as intentionally unlawful detention by a public servant.

The Legislature defined the crime of official oppression with great clarity. When a public servant, acting under color of office, intentionally subjects another to unlawful detention, that public servant has committed a Class A misdemeanor. The exact text of Texas Penal Code § 39.03 states:X

“(a) A public servant acting under color of his office or employment commits an offense if he: (1) intentionally subjects another to mistreatment or to arrest, detention, search, seizure, dispossession, assessment, or lien that he knows is unlawful…”

When a peace officer, following training that violates the Code of Criminal Procedure, takes an arrestee to jail instead of a magistrate, that detention is unlawful. Because the training is systemic and the statutes are clear, the act is intentional. This practice, taught in state-approved classrooms, is the literal definition of official oppression.

Section III. The Constitutional Authority and Duty of the Legislature to Intervene.

A. The Texas Constitution vests all legislative power in the Legislature, and the other branches may not ignore the statutes the Legislature enacts.

The Texas Constitution is unambiguous. It creates three distinct branches of government and assigns each its own power. Article III, Section 1 vests “all legislative power” in the Legislature. The power to write the law belongs to the Legislature alone. The executive branch must enforce the law as written. The judicial branch must apply the law as written. As the Court of Criminal Appeals held in State v. Rhine, “The Texas Constitution vests lawmaking power in the legislature… Only the legislature can exercise that power.” When executive agencies or judicial officers adopt practices that contradict the plain text of a statute, they are exercising a legislative power they do not possess.X

B. The separation of powers doctrine protects legislative supremacy, not executive or judicial independence from law.

The doctrine of separation of powers, found in Article II, Section 1 of the Texas Constitution, is not a shield for the other branches to hide behind when they disobey the law. It is a sword for the Legislature to wield to protect its exclusive lawmaking authority. As a Texas Supreme Court justice wrote in the dissent in In Re Allcat Claims Service, “if the Separation of Powers provision means anything, it is that the Executive must enforce the laws that the Legislature passes.” A 1980 Texas Attorney General Opinion confirmed this, stating, “If one branch exceeds its authority and usurps powers which it does not possess, its acts are a nullity.” A legislative resolution demanding compliance is not an interference; it is a constitutional course correction.X

C. The Legislature has exclusive authority to define crimes, and when the bench and bar ignore that definition, they violate expressed legislative intent.

The Legislature has the sole power to define what constitutes a crime in Texas. As the Court of Appeals held in Eric D. Neil v. State, “The legislature has the exclusive authority to define crimes.” When the Legislature defines official oppression in the Penal Code, that definition is the law. It is not a guideline that can be overridden by “standard procedure” or “prosecutorial discretion.” As the Court of Criminal Appeals noted in State v. Hall, for the bench and bar to use a different definition of misconduct than the one the Legislature wrote “would appear to be contrary to expressed legislative intent.” The current training regimen teaches a practice that the Legislature has already defined as a crime.X

D. A concurrent resolution making formal legislative findings is the proper constitutional vehicle for the Legislature to declare that these practices must end.

The Legislature has the authority and the precedent to address this crisis through a concurrent resolution. While such a resolution does not amend the law, it does not need to—the law is already clear. A concurrent resolution serves as a formal declaration of legislative findings and intent. It puts the executive and judicial branches on notice that the Legislature is aware of the systemic violation of its statutes and that it considers these practices to be contrary to the law of Texas. It provides a clear statement that can be used in court to challenge these unlawful practices and to hold public servants accountable for official oppression. The Legislature has used this tool before to direct state agencies to comply with existing statutes, and it must use it now to restore the rule of law.

Section IV. Proposed Concurrent Resolution Language.

A CONCURRENT RESOLUTION of the 89th Texas Legislature, making formal findings that certain law enforcement, prosecutorial, and judicial practices and procedures are not in concert with standing law, and asserting the intent of the Legislature that all such practices and procedures be adjusted to comply with the law as enacted.

WHEREAS, The Constitution of the State of Texas vests all legislative power in the Legislature, and the duty of the executive and judicial branches is to faithfully execute and apply the laws as enacted by the Legislature; and

WHEREAS, The Legislature of the State of Texas has enacted a comprehensive and interlocking body of law governing criminal procedure, the conduct of public servants, and the rights of the people, including the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, the Texas Transportation Code, and the Texas Penal Code; and

WHEREAS, Specific practices, taught and promulgated through state-approved training, have been brought to the Legislature’s attention that are inconsistent with the plain text of existing statutes, thereby undermining the rule of law and the separation of powers; now, therefore, be it

RESOLVED, That the Legislature of the State of Texas makes the following formal findings:

FINDING: The practice of transporting arrested persons to a jail for booking or processing before taking them to a magistrate for a probable cause determination violates the “without unnecessary delay” command of Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Articles 15.16(a) and 14.06(a), and the “nearest or most accessible” magistrate command of Texas Transportation Code § 543.002.

FINDING: The practice of magistrates deferring to prosecutorial discretion before issuing a warrant violates the mandatory duty to “issue a warrant” upon a sufficient complaint under Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article 15.09.

FINDING: The practice of courts denying or delaying writs of habeas corpus on procedural grounds not found in statute violates the mandatory “duty of the court… to issue the writ” under Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article 11.05.

FINDING: The practice of grand juries acting as a subordinate body to the district attorney, rather than an independent investigative body, violates the command that the grand jury “shall inquire into all offenses” under Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article 20A.051.

FINDING: The practice of prosecutors denying Public Information Act requests without citing a specific statutory exemption or seeking an Attorney General opinion subverts the enforcement mechanism of Texas Government Code § 552.3215(e).

FINDING: The practice of intentionally detaining a person in a manner known to be unlawful, such as detaining them without a prompt magistration as required by law, constitutes the Class A misdemeanor of Official Oppression as defined by Texas Penal Code § 39.03.

BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED, That it is the intent of the Legislature that all Texas law enforcement agencies, district attorneys, courts, and judicial officers shall immediately review and adjust their practices and procedures to comply scrupulously with the statutes cited herein as written; and, be it

BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED, That any practice, policy, or training curriculum inconsistent with the plain text of these statutes is not in concert with the law of this State and is contrary to the expressed will of the Legislature; and, be it

BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED, That the Secretary of State forward official copies of this resolution to the Attorney General of Texas, the Director of the Department of Public Safety, the Executive Director of the Texas Commission on Law Enforcement, the Texas Judicial Council, and the district and county attorneys of this State, with the instruction that it be distributed to all relevant personnel.

Section V. Conclusion and Next Steps.

The law is clear and the crisis is real

The law is not the problem. The Texas Legislature has provided a clear, effective, and just framework for criminal procedure. The problem is a culture of non-compliance, fostered by state-approved training that teaches public servants to violate the very laws they have sworn to uphold. This has created a crisis that fills our jails with people who have not had a probable cause determination, that shields official misconduct from grand jury review, and that erodes the public trust upon which our system of justice depends. This is not a partisan issue; it is a constitutional crisis that strikes at the heart of the rule of law.

A resolution is the first step

A concurrent resolution is the necessary first step. It is a declaration by the lawmaking body of this State that the law is not a set of suggestions. It is a command. Passing this resolution will reassert the Legislature’s constitutional authority, put state actors on formal notice that their illegal practices must end, and equip citizens and attorneys with the clear statement of legislative intent they need to defend their rights in court. We urge you to sponsor and support this resolution and to begin the urgent work of restoring the fine mosaic of Texas law to its rightful place as the supreme guide for the conduct of our government.

Civil Lawsuit Outside The Scope Of Official Capacity

 Civil Lawsuit Outside The Scope Of Official Capacity 

“Plaintiff’s Original Petition and Jury Demand.docx” has been drafted. It is a comprehensive civil lawsuit for filing in Tarrant County District Court, based exclusively on the Boggerman Complaint facts, alleging all defendants acted outside the scope of their official capacity and are therefore personally liable.

The document includes: - A Tarrant County District Court caption - A fully hyperlinked Table of Contents and Table of Authorities - Ten causes of action against all defendants in their individual capacities - Detailed damage calculation tables for each cause of action, citing statutory and case law authority as instructed - A prayer for relief seeking actual, compensatory, exemplary, and punitive damages, statutory penalties, attorney’s fees, and injunctive relief - Consistent legal framing that defendants’ intentional torts and ultra vires acts strip them of official immunity, exposing them to personal liability

You can click the document name in the chat to view it, then click the Download button to export it in Microsoft Word format.

The Right of Access to the Courts When Deprived of Life, Liberty, or Property By Brian Ward

 The Right of Access to the Courts When Deprived of Life, Liberty, or Property 

By Brian Ward

Imagine for a moment that you spent twenty years building a well-established real estate, salon, or other business, or ten years in medical school to become a surgeon, or thirty years on the police force or in the fire service — only to be forced by a state mandate to inject an experimental drug into your body and, as a condition of continuing to enjoy the success you built, to waive your constitutional right to access the courts if that drug injures you. This is no longer hypothetical. It is the legal reality now facing the Nation, the product of historic levels of judicial procedural abuse by the Ninth and other federal circuit courts.1 Beginning in 2021, state actors across the Nation began mandating the use of covered countermeasures — FDA-classified as investigational 2 (i.e., experimental) — that were shielded from civil liability under the PREP Act. In practice, these requirements, backed by the force of law, unconstitutionally compelled Americans to prospectively surrender their right of access to the courts if they were deprived of life, liberty, or property as a result of complying with State policy — leaving them to bear alone the emotional, financial, and legal consequences of any resulting injury for the remainder of their lives— an unspeakable evil. The Supreme Court of the United States has now called for a response in Boysen v. PeaceHealth — a case presenting what is, in its implications, the single most consequential constitutional question the Court can answer.3 Stated plainly: May a State condition access to a public benefit — the right to practice a licensed profession, to hold public employment, to receive an education, or to participate in the ordinary economic life of the community — on an individual’s prospective surrender of the constitutional right to seek a judicial remedy when deprived of life, liberty, or property as a result of complying with a State health mandate?

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1Full details of this abuse is outlined in a report to the U.S. Congress: An Unspeakable Evil: The Coerced Administration of Investigational Drugs and the Covert Experimentation of the American People — A Report to the U.S. Congress on the Conduct of the Department of Health and Human Services, the Food and Drug Administration, and the Judicial Branch, and on the Threat Their Conduct Poses to the National Security of the United States.  (July 2026), CovidPenalty.com. 2 Pfizer-BioNTech COVID-19 Vaccine operates under investigational drug application No. 19736 3 Supreme Court Docket No. 25-1280. Responses are due July 17th, 2026. 

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 The Supreme Court answered this question long ago, establishing a bright-line rule that “a man may not barter away his life or his freedom, or his substantial rights.” Insurance Co. v. Morse, 87 U.S. 445, 451 (1874). Conditioning a constitutional right on the acceptance of a public benefit is not regulation. It is amendment — a transfer of the power to alter the Constitution from the People, in whom Article V vests it, to the political branches of the State, in whom it was never placed. The purpose of this article is to demonstrate why this is so: by tracing the right of access to the courts to its deepest historical roots, establishing its place in the constitutional order, and showing that a century of Supreme Court precedent forbids a State from extracting its surrender through the leverage of a conditioned benefit. 

I. The Right of Access to the Courts: 

Eight Centuries of Guarantee The constitutional right of access to the courts — the right of one member of society to seek redress when another has deprived him of life, liberty, or property — is among the oldest and most deeply rooted rights in the Anglo-American tradition. It predates the Constitution and the common law as we now understand it. In 1215, standing in a water meadow known as Runnymede, in Surrey, England, King John affixed his seal to the Magna Carta. Clause 40 of that Great Charter states: To no one will we sell, to no one deny or delay, right or justice. In one statement, King John was bound by three distinct promises, each of which remains a pillar of the right of access to courts today. First, the King may not sell justice — he may not condition access to the courts on payment of a fee or a bribe. Justice was not a commodity to be purchased by the wealthy and denied to the poor. Second, the King may not deny justice — he may not refuse to hear a subject’s claim. The courts were to remain open to every freeman seeking a remedy for a wrong. Third, the King may not delay justice — he may not indefinitely postpone judgment, because a remedy deferred is effectively denied. Taken together, Clause 40 established a principle that would echo across the next eight centuries: the right to a judicial remedy is not a privilege granted by the sovereign at his pleasure, but a guarantee owed by the sovereign to every subject. The sovereign does not bestow it. The sovereign is bound by it. These principles flowed directly into English common law. Sir Edward Coke, in his Second Institutes, read Clause 40 as the foundation of the subject’s right to the King’s courts, and the principle was settled in English constitutional understanding by the time the American colonies were founded. The colonists carried it across the Atlantic as part of the inheritance of English liberty, and they invoked it against the Crown in the years before independence. By the time of the founding, the right of access to the courts was not an aspiration. It was a fixed star in the constitutional firmament — assumed, relied upon, and understood as fundamental to the very concept of ordered liberty.

II. The Right Is Woven Into the Founding Itself 

The Founders did not merely inherit the right of access to the courts. They ratified it. On June 27, 1788, the Virginia Ratifying Convention, in the act of proposing amendments to the federal Constitution, declared that every freeman ought to find a certain remedy by recourse to the laws for all injuries and wrongs he may receive in his person, property or character. He ought to obtain right and justice freely without sale, completely and without denial, promptly and without delay, and that all establishments or regulations contravening these rights, are oppressive and unjust.4

Read that language beside Clause 40, and the lineage is unmistakable. Without sale, without denial, without delay — the precise triad of Magna Carta, carried forward five and a half centuries and transplanted into the American constitutional project at its founding moment. The Virginia delegation was not improvising. It was consciously invoking the oldest guarantee in the Anglo-American legal tradition and binding the new nation to it. 

The right of access to the courts for a judicial remedy when injured predates the Constitution itself, and it frames the foundation upon which the Constitution rests. The Constitution did not create the right of access to the courts. The Constitution presupposed it — and embedded it within the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV.

III. The Supreme Court Has Recognized the Right and Grounded It in the Constitution 

The Supreme Court has long recognized the right of access to the courts and has grounded it in the deepest structural guarantees of the constitutional order. In Chambers v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co., 207 U.S. 142, 148 (1907), the Court held that access to the courts is “the alternative of force,” “the right conservative of all other rights,” and “one of the highest and most essential privileges of citizenship.” The Court located the right in the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV — among the rights that belong to citizens of the United States by virtue of their citizenship and that no State may abridge. The right “conservative” to all others means that the right to access the courts is the right that secures all other rights. After all, the right to free speech is no right at all if one cannot access the courts to secure it when deprived of it by a state actor.

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4 Jonathan Elliot, The Debates in the Several State Conventions on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution 327 (2d ed. 1836).

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The grounding has only deepened in the century since Chambers. In McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 819–50 (2010), Justice Thomas, concurring, explained that the Privileges or Immunities Clause protects rights understood at ratification as fundamental to citizenship, drawing on Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546, 551–52 (E.D. Pa. 1823), which expressly included among those fundamental privileges the right of access to the State courts for a judicial remedy. The right of access was understood at the time of the Fourteenth Amendment’s ratification to be one of the privileges of citizenship that the Amendment was designed to protect against State abridgment

In Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 415 n.12 (2002), the Court cataloged the multiple constitutional sources on which the right of access has been grounded: the Article IV Privileges and Immunities Clause, the First Amendment’s Petition Clause, the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, and the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. The right is not the creature of any single provision. It is woven through the constitutional fabric, anchored at multiple points, and recognized — at a minimum — as a fundamental right under the Fourteenth Amendment. The Supreme Court has issued opinions in dozens of cases over the last century addressing the right of access, including governmental interference with that right, cost barriers, notification of hearings, the Petition Clause, prisoner access, and public access to hearings. Each opinion reaches the same result: governments cannot establish a barrier to access to courts of law under any circumstances.

The right to a judicial remedy is, in short, inviolable. It inheres in the privilege of citizenship under the federal Constitution. It is, at minimum, a fundamental right secured by the Fourteenth Amendment. And it is the right upon which every other right guaranteed to this Nation depends — for a right without a forum to vindicate it is no right at all.

No President, Governor, mayor, fire chief, university dean — no political actor of any rank or office — may condition access to a licensed profession, public employment, education, healthcare, or welfare assistance on the forfeiture of that right. The Constitution does not permit it. A century of this Court's precedent forbids it. And no official, however empowered, sits above either.

In Curtis v. Inslee,5 the case upon which the Boysen panel relied for dismissal, held that plaintiffs’ “substantive due process claim regarding the PREP Act’s grant of immunity…fails.”6 The claim is that when a state mandates the use of a PREP Act-covered countermeasure, it is mandating that citizens prospectively surrender their right to a judicial remedy if injured by the mandated drug—an unconstitutional condition

When the State conditions a public benefit on the individual’s submission to a PREP Act– covered countermeasure, the State extracts, by operation of law, a prospective waiver of the right to a judicial remedy if injured by the mandated drug. The PREP Act, by its terms, extinguishes any State or federal cause of action for injuries caused by a covered countermeasure, subject only to the willful misconduct exception. 42 U.S.C. § 247d-6d(a), (d). The mandate and the waiver are inseparable. The individual may not comply with the former without suffering the latter. The State has thus achieved, through the leverage of economic survival, what it may never achieve by direct command: the extinguishment of a constitutional guarantee.

The Ninth Circuit, under Curtis and Boysen, on nothing more than personal preference untethered from constitutional law, would permit a political actor to lawfully require an American to play Russian roulette with their life involving experimental drugs — while the actor shields himself from liability when the chamber lands on a live round — an unspeakable evil. Surely the American Revolution began over far fewer grievances than those facing this nation on its 250th birthday.

IV. A Waiver of a Constitutional Right May Never Be Presumed, and May Never Be Coerced 

Because the right of access to the courts is a constitutional guarantee of this magnitude, its surrender is governed by the most demanding standards the Supreme Court imposes on any waiver of any right. A waiver of any constitutional right must be “voluntary, knowing, and intelligently made,” and it must be “an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.” D.H. Overmyer Co. v. Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174, 185–86 (1972); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938). It must be “the product of a free and deliberate choice rather than intimidation, coercion, or deception.” Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370, 382–83 (2010). Courts “do not presume acquiescence in the loss of fundamental rights.” Zerbst, 304 U.S. at 464.

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5 Curtis v. Inslee, No. 24-1869 (9th Cir. Oct. 6, 2025) 6 Id. at 19

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In Janus v. AFSCME, 585 U.S. 878 (2018), the Court reaffirmed that a waiver of a constitutional right must be freely given, shown by clear and compelling evidence, and never presumed. Janus is directly on point and most instructive. The Court there held that public-sector unions could not extract agency fees from nonconsenting employees, because those fees subsidized political speech the employees opposed, and compelling that subsidy amounted to forcing a waiver of First Amendment rights.

Mandating, under threat of losing one’s livelihood, the use of a liability-shielded product under a federal act that waives an individual’s right of access to the courts — without informing the individual that compliance institutes such a waiver — is deceptive, and it is the quintessential definition of coercion. The Supreme Court confronted this structure precisely in Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493 (1967). There, police officers were given a choice: waive the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, or lose their jobs. The Court held that the choice was coercion. “Where the choice is ‘between the rock and the whirlpool,’” the Court wrote, “duress is inherent in deciding to ‘waive’ one or the other.” Id. at 498. The Court held that a waiver extracted under that kind of pressure is no waiver at all, because the choice between forfeiting one’s livelihood and surrendering one’s constitutional rights is no free choice.

The leading modern scholarship reaches the same conclusion. Deborah J. La Fetra, senior attorney at the Pacific Legal Foundation, has argued in Miranda for Janus: The Government’s Obligation to Ensure Informed Waiver of Constitutional Rights that compelled waivers of constitutional rights should be governed by the same disclosure requirements the Court imposes under Miranda — that the Government bears an affirmative obligation to ensure that any waiver is knowing and informed, and that such a waiver must be the product of voluntary consent, not coerced by threats of penalty.

V. A State May Not Accomplish Indirectly What It Is Forbidden to Command Directly

 The Supreme Court has long held that “what the State may not do directly it may not do indirectly.” Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219, 239–44 (1911); Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 518–29 (1958). The principle is not a technicality. It is a structural safeguard against the evasion of constitutional limits, and the Court has guarded it jealously. The foundational statement of the doctrine remains the Court’s warning warning in Frost & Frost Trucking Co. v. Railroad Commission, 271 U.S. 583, 593–94 (1926): 

If the state may compel the surrender of one constitutional right as a condition of its favor, it may, in like manner, compel a surrender of all. It is inconceivable that guaranties embedded in the Constitution of the United States may thus be manipulated out of existence.

A constitutional order in which rights may be conditioned away, one benefit at a time, is a constitutional order in which rights do not exist as guarantees at all. They exist only as privileges, revocable whenever the State finds them inconvenient. That is why the Supreme Court has been relentless in protecting constitutional rights against governmental coercion.

The Supreme Court has held that a government may not condition a tax exemption on the surrender of free speech. Speiser, 357 U.S. at 518–29. It may not condition unemployment benefits on the surrender of the free exercise of religion. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 404 (1963). It may not condition public employment on the surrender of the privilege against self-incrimination. Garrity, 385 U.S. at 497–98. It may not condition public employment on the surrender of academic freedom. Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 605–06 (1967). It may not condition a benefit the State was free to withhold entirely on the surrender of First Amendment rights. Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972). It may not condition public employment on the surrender of the right of political association. Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 360 (1976). It may not condition a land-use permit on the surrender of property rights. Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, 483 U.S. 825, 837 (1987); Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Management District, 570 U.S. 595, 604–06 (2013). The unifying rule, stated and restated across a century, is that the Government may not do indirectly — through the leverage of conditioned benefits — what the Constitution forbids it to do directly. Speiser, 357 U.S. at 526.

The Court has applied that rule to the conditioned-benefit structure in its purest form. In Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 83 (1973), the Court held that a State may not condition public contracts on a contractor’s waiver of the Fifth Amendment privilege against selfincrimination, enforced through the threat of losing existing contracts and being barred from future ones. That is the structure in essence: a public benefit on one side, a constitutional right on the other, and the State demanding the surrender of the latter as the price of the former. A health-policy mandate that relies exclusively on liabilityshielded products presents the identical structure — with a benefit even more essential, the right to earn a living in one’s chosen profession, and a right even more fundamental, the right of access to the courts, conservative of all other rights.

The scholarly literature is unanimous that public benefits cannot be used to barter away constitutional rights. Kathleen M. Sullivan, in the canonical academic treatment of the doctrine, summarized the rule directly: government “may not grant a benefit on the condition that the beneficiary surrender a constitutional right, even if the government may withhold that benefit altogether.” Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 Harv. L. Rev. 1413, 1415 (1989). Richard A. Epstein has argued that the doctrine functions as a structural limit, preventing the Government from accomplishing, through leverage, what it may not accomplish through command. Foreword: Unconstitutional Conditions, State Power, and the Limits of Consent, 102 Harv. L. Rev. 4 (1988). Mitchell N. Berman has analyzed the doctrine as a baseline-coercion problem, demonstrating that wherever the Government holds the power to inflict an unconstitutional condition, the citizen’s apparent consent is necessarily compromised, because the choice has been engineered by the very party the Constitution constrains. Coercion Without Baselines: Unconstitutional Conditions in Three Dimensions, 90 Geo. L.J. 1 (2001). And Philip Hamburger has argued, most directly, that consent is irrelevant where the underlying condition is itself constitutionally impermissible. Unconstitutional Conditions: The Irrelevance of Consent, 98 Va. L. Rev. 479 (2012).

VII. Jacobson Forbids The Waiver — It Does Not Authorize It

The Ninth Circuit, in Curtis, cited to Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905) as support, though in reality it provided none. The Ninth Circuit relied on Jacobson as its foundational support for the rule that a substantive due process challenge to a mandated covered countermeasure fails — holding that the only inquiry before a court reviewing a State health policy is whether the policy furthers a legitimate State interest. That reading inverts what Jacobson actually holds and invalidates the Supremacy Clause. 

The Jacobson Court held that the first inquiry in any constitutional challenge to a state policy is whether the policy intrudes upon the federal Constitution or a field of governance dominated by the federal government. If so, the court must set the policy aside. As the Supreme Court has affirmed, the state's legitimate interests are only those "interests the State has the authority to implement." Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 441 (1985). 

And here, a federal constitutional guarantee is infringed. State mandates for liability shielded products infringe the Constitution’s guarantee of access to the courts when life, liberty, or property is deprived. Jacobson therefore does not authorize these mandates. Jacobson, correctly read, requires that they be invalidated, as Jacobson instructed when the Supreme Court invalidated state health policies under Railroad Company v. Husen, 95 U.S. 465 (1877) (“It seems hardly necessary to argue at length that unless the statute can be justified as a legitimate exercise of the police power of the state, it is a usurpation of the power vested exclusively in Congress.”) Id. at 469. Under Husen, the state’s health

policy of reducing the spread of the Spanish Fever was vacated by the Supreme Court because the policy infringed upon the Commerce Clause. Under Jacobson, no federal statute or constitutional guarantee was implicated — Congress would not enact the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act until 1938, nor the PREP Act until 2005. Under Boysen v. PeaceHealth, valid acts of Congress and the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause are implicated—the Ninth Circuit gave legal effect to neither, thereby stripping the nation of rights modern societies have enjoyed since 1215 A.D.

Conclusion Since Congress enacted the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act (VICP) of 1986, governments have been unconstitutionally mandating involuntary participation in liability-shielded medical products, thereby prospectively stripping the nation of its privilege of citizenship to access constitutional courts for judicial remedy when injured. Congress may provide immunity to a medical product under the VICP or the PREP Act, but once that immunity is lawfully applied, no government can mandate involuntary use of those products as a condition of public benefits, because such mandates achieve indirectly what they can never command directly.7

Until the COVID-19 pandemic, no one had ever presented an argument to an Article III court that a government mandate of liability-shielded products imposed an unconstitutional condition by stripping the right of access to the courts upon injury. Now that the argument has been made, sixteen federal district judges and more than a dozen federal appellate judges have ignored it outright, effectively nullifying the Constitution through silence. Only the Ninth Circuit has directly addressed the claim — and only to declare that there is no fundamental right to refuse a State policy, even one that strips the public of its constitutional guarantees. And so, for the first time in our Nation's history, the fundamental right of access to the courts has been stripped from the Constitution through a backdoor procedural device — effectively amending the Constitution outside the framework Article V requires.

The right of access to the courts descends from Magna Carta. It was ratified at the founding. It is the alternative to force, the right conservative of all other rights, one of the highest and most essential privileges of citizenship. It may not be sold. It may not be denied. It may not be delayed. It may not be presumed away by silence, nor coerced away by the threat of ruin, nor bargained away as the price of a public benefit. It may never be amended out of the Constitution by any actor other than the People themselves.

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7 As detailed in the report to Congress linked in Footnote 1, more than a dozen federal and State courts — including two State supreme courts — have held that the criminal conduct of battery (e.g., secret injections) is shielded from judicial review when the weapon of choice is a product covered by the PREP Act or the VICP. These judges are weaponizing federal acts that can never grant absolute immunity for the criminal act of battery, thereby subjecting the nation to irreparable harm.

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The barons wrested this right from King John in 1215. America's founders gave their blood, their labor, and their fortunes to win independence from the Crown's successors in 1776. Tens of millions of Americans have since worn the uniform, fought in two world wars, and died on the battlefield to ensure that the victory George Washington won would not be lost to new tyrants.

Two hundred fifty years after the founding of this Nation — with no defendant claiming authority to mandate a liability-shielded drug — Ninth Circuit Judges M. Margaret McKeown, Richard A. Paez, and Gabriel P. Sanchez walked onto the battlefield, winked at the State defendants, and affixed the Ninth Circuit's seal to a new order of oppression, empowering political actors to wield public benefits as a weapon of coercion — stripping this Nation of guarantees long secured by eight hundred years of human struggle. Three judges have deputized political actors to act as instruments of oppression on their behalf.8 Millions of lives have been lost in the fight for liberty across the world since King John affixed his seal to the Magna Carta; it only took three corrupt judges to overthrow the most powerful nation in the world.

The United States Solicitor General and the States' attorneys general must make their voices heard in Boysen on behalf of the American people.

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8 Roberts v. Ferguson, pending before the Supreme Court under No. 25-1327, a case dismissed under Curtis, provides a strong argument that states cannot require a waiver of the right of access to the courts as a condition of public benefits.